The Chinese Intelligence threat to the American academic community
The chair of Harvard’s Chemistry Department, Charles Lieber, was arrested in early 2020 for making false statements to the U.S. government regarding research funding he allegedly received from China. Lieber is a prominent scientist and sits at the forefront of the nanotechnology field, and his arrest came as a shock to many in the research community. The United States government is alleging that Lieber deliberately concealed his involvement in China’s Thousand Talents Plan, which is a program administered by the Chinese government to recruit leading academics to set up shop in China and to develop joint research ventures with prestigious outside institutions. How does such a prominent scientist and researcher end up in this situation? Unfortunately, he’s not alone.
Lieber is the most prominent American academic accused of concealing his involvement with the Thousand Talents Plan, but he is certainly not the first or only one. In recent years, U.S. federal law enforcement agencies have arrested dozens of academics and researchers throughout the United States on charges related to the Thousand Talents Plan or for allegations of theft of research and proprietary information.
The Chinese government is a well-known proliferator of sensitive research and intellectual property. Its nefarious activity in this arena is a sticking point behind the current trade dispute playing out between the United States and China. Unlike the U.S., the Chinese government engages in economic espionage as a matter of state policy. Universities, research institutions, and private organizations are prime targets of these efforts by the Chinese. Unfortunately, most academic and research institutions are ill-prepared to counter the threat. As institutions of research and education, state-sponsored economic espionage is generally not at the forefront of their list of concerns and most institutions are not equipped to recognize, prevent, or mitigate it.
The FBI is quite cognizant of the threat and makes every effort to ensure that private and public organizations are aware that they are targets of foreign intelligence services. However, the FBI usually does not have any influence over how those organizations react to its warnings, and the scale of the threat makes effectively educating and alerting the general public difficult.
Universities and research institutions are the first line in their own defense against sophisticated foreign government efforts to gain access to their information and personnel. Academic research, by its nature, is intended for public dissemination and this fact often clouds how institutions perceive the sensitivity of their information. Most institutions receive some form of federal funding and many hold research contracts with the U.S. government, and that funding requires the recipients to be transparent about their affiliation with foreign governments and entities. This transparency allows the U.S. government to make informed decisions about how to allocate research funding and ensures that researchers disclose all potential conflicts of interest.
While most academic and private sector research is not classified, the Chinese government still looks to acquire it because doing so often affords it an economic advantage in the development of new systems or technology. This is one of many areas where Chinese and U.S. government policies are very different: the Chinese openly advocate economic espionage as means to gain an edge over competitors, whereas the U.S. government does not.
In an effort to clandestinely acquire sensitive information, foreign intelligence officers look to identify and exploit perceived vulnerabilities in individuals with access to the information that they are interested in. Intelligence officers leverage financial incentives and personal characteristics to manipulate their targets into doing their bidding. The inclination toward collaboration and the multitude of available research funding mechanisms make the academic community a particularly ripe hunting ground. Approaching a researcher with an offer of collaboration or a funding opportunity is not irregular in the academic world and is a potentially lucrative avenue of approach for a foreign adversary. Once a relationship is in place, a foreign intelligence officer has the opportunity to begin steering the targeted individual into a clandestine reporting relationship. This process can take a few weeks, a few months, or a few years. But it can and does happen.
A skilled foreign intelligence officer will slowly acclimate his target to the situation and move the relationship in a graduated fashion toward the end goal: a clandestine relationship in which the target provides sensitive information to the foreign intelligence officer in return for some benefit. That benefit is often financial, but may also hinge on friendship, personal trust, romantic interest, or some combination of factors. Often, by the time the targeted individual realizes what has happened, it is either too late or the person has become so accustomed to the relationship and perceived benefits that they continue to participate willingly.
Others in the academic and business communities may be more willing to engage in a relationship with a foreign intelligence officer without as much courtship. These individuals may be blindly driven by ego or financial incentives and may fully realize what they are doing and have little hesitation in doing it. These individuals require little acclimatization. In either case, both types of individual are ultimately aware of what they are doing and continue to do so willingly.
A third category of targets are those who are truly naïve to the purpose of the relationship or the true identity of the foreign intelligence officer. This is a small category of people who genuinely believe that they are engaging in a legitimate relationship with another academic or research institution. Their naivety provides the entre into the relationship, and their negligence or willful blindness to the situation perpetuates it.
A research or academic institution can protect the integrity of its information and personnel by providing education on the nature of the threat. Incorporating counterintelligence into an annual training requirement and providing case studies and clear guidelines on disclosure of funding sources and affiliations will have a substantial impact on ensuring that personnel are aware of the threat. All institutions should thoroughly vet incoming and existing academics and researchers, paying particular attention to those who may be concealing foreign military or intelligence affiliation. In most cases, the U.S. government would be a willing partner in assisting those institutions that have questions about a member of their faculty or staff. Education will help prevent otherwise innocent people from finding themselves in trouble. Additionally, an institution that demonstrates its awareness of the threat will present itself as a harder target and will deter many of those who have nefarious intentions from the start.
Given the prevalent and public nature of the threat, it is incumbent on academic and research institutions to take measures to address it. Our nation cannot afford to have its prominent academics co-opted and its valuable research pilfered. Awareness and education will go a long way toward countering the threat. Responsible institutions should ensure that they have programs and personnel in place to protect their institutions and their personnel. Without the proper safeguards in place, academic and research institutions are sitting ducks for sophisticated and competent foreign intelligence services whose sole purpose for existing is to pilfer information. If institutions ignore or fail to adequately address the threat, they do so at their own peril.
